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1 In their review of the endorsement of the term ‘demographic engineering’ in Ottoman
and Turkish studies, Nikos Sigalas and Alexandre Toumarkine (2008: §12) underscored
three reasons why the term particularly gained the favor of some scholars: it supports
the idea of continuity between the late Ottoman empire and the Turkish nation-state, it
meets  with  a  liberal  critique  of  state  planning  understood  as  paving  the  way  for
violence against minorities, and it helps in circumventing the taboo imposed by state
ideology and apparatus over its own repressive history towards minorities. It is this
latter aspect Erik-Jan Zürcher (2008: 1) invokes to explain why he first used the term
back  in  2005.  Fearing  to  be  exposed  to  state  reprisals,  Turkish  academics  invited
Zürcher to introduce a collective volume published in Turkish in Turkey in which he
used the term demographic engineering (Zürcher 2005). Yet, as Sigalas and Toumarkine
remark,  state  repression  alone  does  not  explain  why  the  term  took  root.  Indeed,
Zürcher  (2008:  1)  concedes  that  it  proved  to  be  more  than  a  tactical  move,  as
‘demographic engineering’ became a positive source of inspiration he found in a work
by two demographers, the late Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum (2001), in their
co-authored book titled Political Demography, Demographic Engineering. 
2 My contribution to this third issue is on rather than in demographic engineering. I take
issue with a narration of the history of humanity as a ‘struggle for demographic power’
(Bookman  1997)  underpinning  the  category  of  demographic  engineering.  I  regard
demographic engineering as naturalizing the connection between population, territory
and security eschewing both the modern codification of the concept of population and
its power effect. My argument is that the connection between security and population
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underlying the category of demographic engineering is not the ‘natural’ behavior of
‘populations’  it  presents,  and  even  promotes,  but  an  artefact  of  demographic
knowledge.  Therefore,  my  aim  is  to  shed  light  on  the  power  effect  of  modern
demographic  knowledge  –population  theories,  demographic  concepts  and
methodology- as a way of a critique of the category of demographic engineering. It is
beyond  the  scope  of  this  essay  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  historical  legacy  of
viewing  populations  in  struggle  for  survival;  rather,  I  will  limit  myself  to  a  few
instances. I organize my essay as follows: first I discuss some of the basic assumptions
in demographic engineering literature and oppose to it Michel Foucault’s concept of
bio-politics of the population. In the second section, I address the connection between
security  and  population  in  population  theories  and  its  reformulation  in  interwar
Europe  within  the  ‘racial  suicide’  discourse.  In  the  third  section,  I  comment  on
genealogical  graphs  (published  in  Bertaux  2006:  296-297)  from  the  archives  of
Demorazza, the General Direction for Demography and Race that was established to
monitor the racial laws in fascist Italy in 1938, hosted at the Italian state archives in
Rome. My aim is to show how the fiction of a first generation of separated populations
(i.e. ‘Aryans’ and ‘Jews’) was a requirement for anti-Semitic politics. In the last section, I
discuss  the  effect  of  using  demographic  concepts  and  methods  to  account  for  the
Armenian genocide and count what becomes in such narrative, ‘Armenian casualties.’
 
II. Political Demography: the Population/Security
Nexus
3 Demographic engineering policies ‘that caused the resettlement and ethnic cleansing of
targeted populations,’ Milica Zarkovic Bookman (1997: 4) argues, are not new for they
‘have characterized Emperor Justinian’s quests in North Africa; the Spanish expulsion
of  Jews and Moors from Spanish territory;  European conquests  of  North and South
American indigenous populations and the forcible removal  of  Africans for sale  into
slavery.’  By  bringing  together  different  cases  from  different  times  and  spaces,  the
demographic engineering literature renders the historical context irrelevant. To put on
the same plane slave trade, forced migrations, state-led politics of (forced) assimilation,
organized race riots, cases of genocide, mass exterminations and so forth is amenable
to the critique brought a decade ago by Mark Mazower (2002: 1160) when he took issue
with  the  ranking  of  ‘the  Holocaust  as  a  historical  benchmark  for  modern  mass
violence.’ His point was that in the wake of the return of totalitarian theories, state-
centered approaches to violence overlook non-state actors while categories of genocide
and ethnic cleansing downplay specific contexts and say little or nothing about the
weakness or strength of the state, and more broadly, power structure and dynamics.
Whereas the revival of totalitarian theories aimed at opposing an ethnic explanation to
ethnic hatred (Mazower 2002: 1159) I suggest that, demographic engineering tends to
naturalize  them.  What  is  more,  to  contend  that  Europe  between  1850  and  1950
experienced the ‘age of demographic engineering’ as Zürcher (2008: 1) does, relegates
in fact the Holocaust as yet another instance in the long catalogue of human violence
listed  under  the  rubric  of  demographic  engineering.  If  demographic  engineering
flattens rather than sheds light on these instances,  and prevents us from recasting
them both in their historic singularity and in comparative perspective, it is not because
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of  a  state-centered  approach  to  violence  and  specific  forms  of  state  power  (i.e.
totalitarianism) but because what is at issue are struggles between populations.
4 Admittedly, demographic engineering found a favourable terrain for its promotion in
the wake of heightened murderous ethnic-based conflicts and in the establishment of
genocide,  minority and conflict  resolution studies in the 1990s in the United States
(Sigalas  and  Toumarkine  2008:  §34).  Unlike  the  categories  of  genocide  and  ethnic
cleansing that have been elaborated for legal purposes and at times, transferred into
historical analysis, the category of demographic engineering however is borrowed from
another field of study, the field of demographic studies. The question is no longer the
way states manage their minorities or citizens at large, but the relationship between
one population to  another.  The state  is,  in  this  perspective,  the  instrument  of  one
population against other populations.
5 In  the  perspective  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  demographic  engineering  is  a
category that emerged from the will of demographers to create a new field of political
demography.  Arguing  that  the  political  implications  of  population  trends  and
movements are central in the study of politics,  they call for a new approach to the
study of politics by bringing to the fore demographic expertise.  One should bear in
mind that demography or population studies are foremost taught under other well-
established  academic  disciplines  (such  as  historical  demography)  or  other  fields  of
study  (for  instance,  urban,  migration  or  health  studies)  on  the  one  hand,  and
demographic  research conducted under  the auspices  of  state  institutes  such as  the
French National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) or private foundations such
as the US-based Population Council. Political demography is a new term for an old idea,
namely that demography is a discipline of government.
6 Political demography was actively promoted in France in the early eighties. In 1982, an
Interdisciplinary Seminar of Political Demography (SIDP) was held at the Collège de
France, the highest French academic institution, and promoted by Alfred Sauvy, the
long-term director of the INED and Honorary Professor at the Collège de France (Sauvy
et al. 1982). It was organized by non-academic institutions, the Political Demography
Institute and the Association for Demographic Research and Information (APRD), both
presided  by  Gérard-François  Dumont,  who defined  political  demography as  putting
‘problems of population’ into the life of the polis (Dumont 1982: 17). What were these
population problems? Demographers argued that France was weakened by low fertility
leading  to  an ageing  trend and undermining  its  capacity  to  assimilate  immigrants.
Because those immigrants deemed unassimilable in French demographic literature, the
postcolonial labour migrants and their families, had settled in their former metropolis,
demographers  argued  that  French  national  identity  was  being  radically  altered
(Bertaux  2000).  These  trends  were  not  to  be  halted  easily ;  countries  of  the  Third
World- a term coined by Sauvy in 1952- were experiencing high fertility rates whereas
West  European  countries  were  encountering  low  fertility  rates,  and  this  would
inevitably lead to more emigration from the Third World to Europe, putting Europe in
danger  of  becoming  ‘submerged’  by  Third  World  immigrants  (Sauvy 1987).  French
demographers  could  draw  from  a  century-old  demographic  discourse  that  made  a
structural  connection  between  labour  immigration  starting  in  the  late  nineteenth
century in France, declining fertility and the future of national identity (Bertaux 2011).
To  reverse  such  trend  they  called  for  more  ‘native’  births  in  order  to  maintain
Frenchness. ‘Native’ is not a category based on citizenship distinguishing foreigners
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from citizens, or on birthplace distinguishing those born in France or abroad, but a
racialized  one  that  distinguished  ‘French  of  French  stock’  and  those  of  ‘immigrant
background,’  two mutually  opposite  categories  codified  in  the  1990s  (Bertaux 1997;
Bertaux 2000). 
7 It is no coincidence that differential fertility rates and international migrations are the
core  themes  of  political  demography  (Teitelbaum  and  Winter  1998 ;  Demeny  and
McNicoll  2006).  A  case  in  point  in  political  demographic  expertise  is  provided  by
Population Council demographer Paul Demeny (1986). To counter low fertility rates in
Europe  and in  order  to  avoid  both  immigration or  welfare  provisions  as  remedies,
Demeny suggested nothing less than exchanging universal suffrage for a family-based
electoral  system,  in  which parents  cast  votes  on behalf  of  their  children.  This  vote
familial was a central proposition to interwar French pro-natalist demographers against
the granting of political rights to French women, which they eventually gained in 1944.
The family vote sought to give them subordinated political rights within a patriarchal
system that recognized women as mothers, wives or widows rather than as individual
citizens  (Bertaux  2011).  My  point  is  that  demographic  engineering  is  hardly  an
analytical category ; it is too or even foremost a policy-making category.
8 Demographic language is foremost a language of identity staging the ‘we’ against the
‘them’;  this  is  a  language  of  security.  Whether  it  is  about  ‘depopulation’  or
‘overpopulation,’ as Ian Hacking (2002: 18) remarks the ‘population problem’ is always
posited in relative terms for it ‘denotes both the population explosion of other peoples
and too low birth rate of one’s own people.’ Political demography is predicated on the
assumption that there is an inherent connection between population and security (for
instance,  Goldstone  et  al. 2012).  Herein,  Weiner  and  Teitelbaum  (2001:  ix)  write:
‘Population-  its  growth or  decline,  its  movement,  its  density,  its  characteristics,  its
distribution- has always been linked to questions of security. The movement of peoples
has made and unmade states, and transformed societies.’  It begs the question, what
constitutes a population in political demography? Populations are more than a mere
aggregate  of  individuals  or  a  concept  of  population  that is  linked  to  territorial
sovereignty and designates the inhabitants  under a  sovereign power in a  delimited
territory ;  instead,  individuals  are  bound up by a  common identity.  The concept  of
population in political demography is best understood, I believe, as a biological closed
reproductive  group  endowed  with  a  common identity.  That  ethnic  groups  and
populations are interchangeable is clear in Milica Zarkovic Bookman (1997: 1) when she
defines  demographic  engineering  as  a  ‘war  of  numbers’  in  order  ‘to  increase  the
economic and political power of an ethnic group relative to others, and the method by
which this is  achieved entails  the increase in the size of one population relative to
others.’  Herein,  populations  are  primordial  categories  that  pre-exist  the  state  and
‘societies.’  The  least  that  can  be  said  is  that  such  an  approach  naturalizes  power
relations  by  reifying  the  state,  obfuscates  internal  heterogeneity  based  on  class,
gender, and inherent cultural diversity of various groupings, contributing to give an
essentialist definition to ethnic groups. 
9 Contrary to  such naturalizing effects  on which the field  of  political  demography is
premised  on,  I  contend  that  population  is  a  modern  concept  and  an  artefact  of
demographic knowledge that turns populations and their intrinsic biological features
into a security issue. Recapturing the history of the modern concept of population and
its  intricacy  in  modern forms of  power  in  Western societies  was  central  to  Michel
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Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. Foucault (1978, 137-138) pointed out how the rise of
demographic knowledge in the eighteenth century – and with it population statistics-
signalled a transformation of power in which the ‘ancient right to take life and let live
was  replaced  by  the  power  to  foster  life  or  disallow  it  to  the  point  of  death.’  In
biopower,  the  stake  is  no  longer  sovereignty  juridically  defined  but  ‘the  biological
existence  of  a  population.’  He  wrote,  ‘If  genocide  is  indeed  the  dream  of  modern
powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill ; it is because
power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-
scale phenomena of population.’
10 Demographic  engineering  does  more  than  ignoring  contexts ;  it  erases  the  role  of
demographic knowledge. By positing population as an independent variable, stripped
out of its historical and political economic context, it leads to believe that it is an easily
manipulable object.  Turning a population into a security matter is not a theoretical
view  but  becomes  a  matter  of  necessity.  Political  demography  (and  demographic
engineering) are antithetical to Foucault’s concept of the biopolitics of the population,
in another dimension. With the concept of biopolitics, Foucault aimed at laying down a
theory  of  racism in  which  difference  or  ‘other  populations’  do  not  pre-exist  racist
politics but are constituted by it. In demographic engineering populations are the very
cause of racism, thereby racist politics becomes a natural attribute of humanity in its
inherent diversity. Ultimately, to regard the Holocaust as an ethnic conflict in Europe,
as if  the Aryans were an ethnic group that succeeded in seizing power,  is  no small
victory to Aryan ideology.
 
III. Population Theory, the ‘Struggle for Population’ and
‘Race Suicide’
11 The  connection  between  population  and  security  was  central  to  Thomas  Robert
Malthus who elaborated the first comprehensive population theory. With his Essay on
the Principle of Population, first published anonymously in 1798, and duly authored in its
subsequent revised and enlarged editions, Malthus provided the European bourgeoisie
its justification not to confront the social question he gave a ‘natural’ cause, fertility.
Against the ideas and ideals of the supporters of the French revolution, Malthus aimed
to demonstrate that human institutions and hierarchies were shaped by the ‘principle
of population’ – or human fertility – and therefore, not amenable to social reform. Even
worse, he argued that any attempt to relieve poverty, by missing its cause, would lead
to the opposite outcome. Malthus was the first to hold a chair in Modern History and
Political Economy in England in 1805 (Collini et al. 1983: 67) and he is today widely
regarded as the father of demography. 
12 Malthus  (1976/1798)  explained  that  ‘population,  when  unchecked,  increases  in  a
geometrical ratio’ whereas ‘subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.’  This
unbalance creates the conditions for a  struggle over subsistence that results  in the
negative checks that are war, misery, and vice. To avoid overpopulation, he suggested
some  remedies  shaped  by  his  religious  system  of  morality.  Condemning  the
disconnection  between  sexuality  and  procreation  on  the  one  hand  and  sexuality
outside marriage on the other, he suggested that the poor engage in a ‘moral restraint,’
namely  pre-marital  sexual  abstinence,  or  even  to  the  abandonment  of  marriage
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altogether, that is, to life-long sexual abstinence. Infamously, Malthus (1992/1803, 249)
denied a right to the means of subsistence: 
‘A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence
from his parents on whom he has just demand, and if the society do[es] not want
his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and in fact, has no
business to be where he is. At nature’s mighty feast there is no vacant cover for
him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he does
not work upon the compassion of some of her guests.’
13 For Karl Marx (Grundisse 1857/58, in Tucker 1976: 277), not only did Malthus gave a
‘brutal expression to the brutal viewpoint of capital’  but elaborated the fallacy of a
natural overpopulation when treating ‘overpopulation as being of the same kind in all
the different historic phases of economic development.’ Malthus ‘does not understand
their  specific  difference,  and  hence stupidly  reduces  these  very  complicated  and
varying relations to a single relation, two equations, in which the natural reproduction
of humanity appears on the one side, and the natural reproduction of edible plants (or
means of subsistence) on the other, as two natural series, the former geometric and the
latter arithmetic in progression.’ For Marx, surplus population was relative, and not
related to the means of subsistence but to the condition of producing them and the
‘Malthusian  natural  man’  is  to  be  found  only  in  Malthus’  population  theory  and
political economy, not in history.
14 Nevertheless, the naturalization of reproduction as an ahistorical law or a principle of
population remained influential and indeed inspired Charles Darwin (2003/1859: 135)
in his elaboration of the theory of  evolution.  Darwin acknowledges his debt to ‘the
doctrine of Malthus’: 
‘Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in
every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the
same  species,  or  with  the  individual  of  distinct  species,  or  with  the  physical
condition of life (…) for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and
no  prudential  restraint  from  marriage.  Although  some  species  may  be  now
increasing, more or less rapidly in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would
not hold them.’
15 In 1880s, inspired by Darwin’s concepts of natural and sexual selection, Francis Galton
coined the  term ’eugenics’  to  designate  a  new science  of  human heredity.  Galton’s
eugenics was based on the belief  that social  hierarchy has a biological  base,  but as
higher social classes had fewer children than lower classes, many eugenicists believed
that the nation would soon be in the hands of the lower classes they despised. The
encounter between Malthus’ fear of the prolific lower classes with the science of the
well-born, in the new era of the masses, brought a new question to the fore: would the
future of the nation belongs to those who reproduce more – the masses – rather than
the elite? Power is no longer in the monopolization of means of production, wealth and
intellectual leadership; it is fundamentally one related with numbers, innate qualities
and fitness. In addition, as birth rates displayed steady declining trends in many West
European countries, there was a concern with depopulation. 
16 The theme of  ‘racial  suicide’  captured aspects  of  both quality  and quantity,  one of
degeneration as the unfit took over the nation, and one of decadence as the number of
nationals would decrease. This view was exemplified by American biologist Raymond
Pearl (1912: 48) who stated at the First International Congress of Eugenics in 1912:
‘The progressive decline of the birth rate in all, or nearly all, civilized countries is
an obvious and impressive fact. Equally obvious and much more disturbing is the
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fact that this decline is  differential… generally it  is  true that those racial  stocks
which by common agreement are of high, if not the highest, value, to the state or
nation, are precisely the ones where the decline in reproduction rate has been most
marked.’
17 Pearl  devised  his  own theory  of  population –  the  logistic  S  curve  (Ramsden 2002)-
providing a law of diminishing fertility. Drawing from his experiments with fruit flies
(drosophila) in petri dishes, Pearl (1939) argued that A Natural History of Population could
be  written  based  on a  law of  density  and growth applying  to  all  living  organisms.
Against  Malthus’  population  theory,  Pearl  claimed  that  populations  reach,  after  a
certain  point,  their  saturation  point.  To  make  clear  how  ‘natural’  Pearl  believed
population trends in fertility and mortality to be is exemplified by the fact that he took
as  a  case  in  point  the  native  population  in  French  Algeria.  Denying  the  impact  of
colonization was to deny fertility as a product of complex social arrangements. Pearl
was  not  the  only  scholar  to  elaborate  a  population  theory  alternative  to  Malthus.
Corrado Gini, the influential demographer of the Italian fascist regime, sought too to
explain how ‘nations’  are  born,  mature and eventually  die  out.  Gini  suggested that
Italians could regenerate the ‘old’ nations in decay, namely Britain and France (Bertaux
1999). 
18 My aim is not to narrate the complex history of transnational debates over the impact
of the uneven distribution of fertility rates across social classes, races, cultural groups
or nations, or the politics of population implemented in their wake. Rather, I want to
underscore how populations were apprehended in their biological features and made
available  to  political  intervention.  Ever  since  Malthus,  fertility  was  regarded  as  a
natural  and  independent  variable.  Demography  was  thought  and  practiced  as  a
biosocial  field  of  study,  and  in  fact,  population  theoreticians  rejected  the  title  of
demographer. One major obstacle remained: how could fertility be properly measured?
Once  again  the  question  was  solved  through  furthering  the  naturalization  and  de-
socialization  of  fertility.  Among  others,  Alfred  James  Lotka  (1939)  gave  fertility  its
mathematical codification. He elaborated the model of stable population – exposed in
his  book Théorie  analytique  des  associations  biologiques  ( Analytical  Theory  of  Biological
Associations)- according to which closed populations, i.e. without migration movements
and, with constant fertility and mortality rates would have a constant rate of growth.
Ever since,  it  remains central  to  population studies  (see my last  section).  This  new
calculus is based on women alone or what is known as the ‘one-sex model.’ With the
new codifications of fertility, the question was not as previously how many births for
how many people, but how many surviving women in the age of procreation will give
birth  to  how  many  daughters.  The  social  aspect  of  reproduction,  and  its  political
economic context, is definitively erased. Consequentially, mortality does not have the
same meaning for all the components of the population: that of a baby girl does not
have the same value as that of an old man ; nor is that of a woman after her procreative
period. 
19 In the 1930s, the codification of fertility made population forecasting easier. Population
projections depicted West European nations on the verge of extinction, and ultimately,
the white population as a whole, likely to be submerged by non-white races, a cause or/
and a symptom of European decadence. Populations were ageing and lacked the vitality
of ‘youth.’ The discourse of a specific ‘white race suicide’ was staged through statistical
tables, novel graphic representations including population pyramids, and population
forecasts.  For  instance,  French  population  and  economic  statistician  Alfred  Sauvy
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(1936)  I  mentioned  earlier,  wrote  in  the  Encyclopédie  française a  demographic  piece
inspired by the vitalism promoted in  fascist  regimes:  ‘If  German and German-Latin
peoples, actually living upon an acquired speed’ are doomed ‘to ageing and decline,’ if
‘peoples from central Europe’ are engaged in the same trend of ‘decadence’ with some
delay, ‘yellow populations do not give any sign of decay. In between the two worlds,
Russia remains the great enigma of tomorrow and, even of today. Its evolution will
decisively influence the demographic and political future of Europe.’ In Sauvy’s text,
the threat is coming from Bolshevik Russia rather than fascist regimes which, unlike
the Soviet Union, were actively trying to raise their fertility rate to claim greater space
for their prolific nations.  French demographers lauded fascist politics of population
they misrepresented as ‘pro-natalist’ (Bertaux 2005, 2011). 
20 This misrepresentation – politically convenient – obfuscated the fact that slogans such
as ‘strength in numbers’  (Mussolini)  or that the view of women as mothers in Nazi
Germany concealed that what constituted the highest biological value for the nation
and its imperial designs, or the white race, was a continuous object of elaboration. The
Struggle for Population (Glass 1936), as one British scholar called it, was predicated on the
‘natural  extinction’  of  West  European  nations.  Obviously,  this  did  not  occur.  Nazi
Germany  led  simultaneously  pro-  and  anti-natalist  policy  according  to  different
‘populations’ to the point of suppressing the ‘lives unworthy of life’ and non-Aryans
altogether (Bock 1983). 
 
IV. The Making of Racial Jews: Genealogy and the
Fiction of Purity in Fascist Italy
21 On July 14th, 1938, a manifesto on Fascism and the Problems of Race – best known as the
Manifesto of the Racist Scientists – published in Il Giornale d’Italia launched the anti-
Semitic  campaign.  While  borrowing  from  Nazi  Germany,  the  Italian  racist  politics
already diversely enacted in Italian colonies to prevent racial mixing, was presented as
a new turn in fascism. Signed by scientists, including the head of the Italian census
bureau, it  provided its scientific legitimacy to state racism. The manifesto aimed at
explaining in 10 points to the Italian public that races are a scientific fact, and racism a
suitable politics: ‘It Is Time for Italians to Proclaim Themselves Frankly Racist’ point 7
stated. The manifesto was wholly dedicated to prove that Jews were never assimilated
in the Italian race and retained their  racial  features,  while  on the other  hand,  the
Italian race was reconceptualized as part of the Aryan race. Published on Bastille Day,
the manifesto argued that the emancipation of the Jews by the French Revolution – that
is,  the  equality  of  status  with  Christian  populations  –  did  not  lead,  in  Italy,  to
assimilation. Such a claim played out two different understandings of assimilation: a
juridical one which, after the French revolution, emancipated the Jews, turning them
into citizens, and a new eugenics understanding, that of miscegenation. To claim that
Jews were never assimilated referred to the latter understanding in order to justify new
legal discrimination against Jews: Jews never blended with the Italo-Aryan race.
22 With the racial laws in Italy, a new General Direction of Demography and Race –known
as Demorazza – was created. How novel this conflation between population and race
was is provided by four genealogical graphs in a single document from the archives of
Demorazza.1 The document has the clear task for its anonymous author to make sense
of what constitutes a racial Jew as proclaimed in the new law. It reveals how the civil
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servant juggles to comprehend the novel ‘racial  Jew,’  hence that there was nothing
evident in the passage from a religious definition to one based on race.
23 These graphs are important because they illustrate how the constitution of racial Jews
and Italian-Aryans as two mutually exclusive categories does not draw from language,
territory or nationality, the traditional categories of nationalism, but from genealogy.
Many Italians born in Jewish families did not practice any religion, and an estimated
one-third married outside the religious community, and a significant number had also
converted to Catholicism. In the eye of the anti-Semitic laws, some were nevertheless
ascribed to the state category of Jew. If names and registration in Jewish institutions
served as means to track down a Jewish population, ultimately it was genealogy that
helped  to  incorporate  those  who  could  not  be  held  as  Jews  according  to  religious
criteria  or  names,  and  ascribe  to  them  a  racial  Jewish  identity  independent  from
religion. The making of racial Jews was foremost a demographic task, and it rests on the
necessary  fiction  of  purity  at  the  first  generation,  namely  when  the  individual  is
defined by one population or race. 
24 All four genealogical trees represent three generations. The first genealogical tree (a) is
dedicated to purity: all individuals represented by blue dots are represented as Jews,
but even purity remains elusive to the anonymous civil servant who passes from the
definition of Jews through ‘family names’ to end up defining it as ‘pure blood’ over
three generations. It also obliges him to work with the reproductive concept of the
couple when he had erased his first mention of family. The second genealogical tree (b)
introduces a first intermarriage at the first generation when an Italian represented by a
red dot marries with a Jew. At the third generation, the grand children are still ‘Jewish
blood’ at 75 %. It is blatant that what is at issue is the third or ‘present’ generation. In
the next graph (c), whether the intermarriage takes place at the second generation (c1)
or at the first (c2),  the last generation is half Jewish, half Italian. Whether they are
considered  of  Aryan  Italian  race  or  of  Jewish  race  is  a  matter  of  law.  The  last
genealogical tree, racial Jew is introduced as the first generation giving birth to grand-
children  with  25 %  of  ‘Jewish  blood’:  therefore  ‘Italians’  is  the  verdict.  These
genealogical trees are one instance of how demographic knowledge rests upon a fiction
of purity that holds separate closed populations with reproductive power and examines
its  potential  mixing.  In  the  last  section,  I  raise  another  question:  how  does  this
representation  of  populations  as  separated  closed  groups  impact  on  the  writing  of
history? 
 
V. ‘Stable Populations’ and the Case of Armenian
‘Casualties’
25 Numbers  are  at  the  core  of  negationist  language.  There  is  nothing  curious  that
negationists  draw  from  the  authority  of  numbers  and  statistics  because  what  is
expected  is  a  truth  effect  through  the  simple  use  of  statistics  and  numbers.  Anti-
Semitic laws, deportations, camps and so on, are made irrelevant to this numeric truth.
There  are  more  or  less  sophisticated  versions  of  what  I  term  the  arithmetic
negationism. If for long, providing lower numbers against those established by serious
historical  scholarship was sufficient  for  negationists  to  gain an audience,  there are
more sophisticated versions of arithmetic negationism today. The Armenian genocide
is a case in point.
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26 As Marc Nichanian (2006) reminds us, the nature of genocide is ‘to cancel itself as a
fact.’  Bringing the proof of  the genocide is  therefore playing into the hands of  the
executioners.  Nichanian’s  reflexion  on  ‘the  historiographic  perversion’  that  results
from the essence of genocide of not being a fact in the case of the Catastrophe, is of
utmost relevance in a discussion on demographic engineering.  Recent discourses of
‘forgiveness’ and ‘reconciliation’ have perceptibly moved the Catastrophe from denial
to recognition in Turkey. Yet, this move is preceded, and is perhaps sustained today as
well, with a new arithmetic provided not from historical analysis but from the use of
demographic concepts and methodologies. 
27 In the early eighties, Justin McCarthy (1983) applied to Ottoman populations the model
of stable populations forged by Alfred James Lotka, whom I mentioned above. Recall
that the model is based on a closed population, excluding any migration movements. In
the 1960s, it was used as an instrument at the Population Division of the United Nations
to establish ‘life  tables’  for  countries  lacking statistical  data.  It  is  one of  the major
instruments in demographic analysis  today.  Drawing from Lotka’s  stable population
model, McCarthy reached the number of 600,000 Armenians casualties between 1914
and  1922.  One  may  view  McCarthy’s  work  as  one  of  the  early  work  in  political
demography in the eighties, and indeed a successful transfer from demographic studies
to historical investigation. His estimate is widely endorsed by historians and political
scientists today. Yet few scholars seem aware that McCarthy draws from a demographic
model and calculus and few question how McCarthy obtained the number of 600,000 or
his underlying assumption in approaching the genocidal case of Ottoman Armenians
through demographic concepts and methods. Once elaborated, these numbers acquire
the power of truth and become a hard fact of history, demography and politics. It is
surprising that his estimate has gained such authoritative value, and it does reveal that
demographic and statistical methods still pass for having a superior scientific status as
approximating  the  methods  of  natural  or  ‘hard’  sciences  at  the  detriment  of
painstaking historical work.
28 Frédéric  Paulin (2000)  provides a  thorough critique of  McCarthy’s  use of  the stable
population model to investigate the death toll of Armenians. Paulin makes two related
arguments.  First,  he  reminds  us  that  both  the  Ottoman  state  and  the  Armenian
patriarchate provided different numbers on the Armenian population before the war,
the  former  estimating  at  1,3  million,  the  latter  at  2,1  million.  McCarthy  compiles
various sources with no serious grounding,  Paulin argues.  Second,  Paulin forcefully
shows how the requirements for the application of the model of stable populations are
not met in the case of late Ottoman Empire.  As I  underscored earlier,  Lotka’s work
emerged  from  the  view  of  a  natural  history  of  populations  grasped  as  biological
reproductive groups. This method must be used only where variations in fertility and
mortality  are  assumed to  be  small  and where migrations  have little  impact  on the
studied  population;  this  is  not  the  case.  Therefore,  McCarthy’s  work  fails  by  two
scientific  standards.  It  fails  from the historical  perspective of  a critical  appraisal  of
sources; it fails from the demographic standard in his application of stable population
theory.
29  Reaching the ‘true’ or ‘reasonable’ number conceals how it puts in motion another
historical narrative. Paulin unveils how this new arithmetic aims at recasting the two
communities on the same footing as ‘both murderers and both victims.’ Away from the
denial  vs.  recognition  frame  that  prevails  today,  McCarthy  revamps  the  Armenian
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genocide  as  an  ethnic  conflict.  As  Paulin  points  out,  he  obtains  this  confrontation
between two ‘different populations’ only through an ungrounded move from proportion
-  the  death rate  among the  Armenians  is  much greater  than Muslims -  to  absolute 
numbers in which Muslims have a higher loss than Armenians. After Daniel Panzac,
Paulin notes that most Armenians died from spring to winter in 1915 whereas most
Muslims between 1916 and 1919. The confrontation thesis is simply ungrounded.
30 McCarthy’s work is typical of how political demography in providing us with a specific
narrative that naturalizes power and history. It also raises political questions: If the
‘true’ number is a preliminary step to the recognition of the Catastrophe, it also voids
recognition from any meaning. The point I  made earlier regarding the Holocaust is
valid  here  as  well:  the  Armenian  genocide  becomes  another  instance  in  the  long
murderous list under the rubric of demographic engineering. Its singularity and own
voice  are  made  irrelevant ;  it  has  no  name.  One  should  be  concerned  if  calls  to
reconciliation are made on such flawed ground.
 
Conclusion
31 Demographic  engineering  may  prove  to  have the  opposite  of  the  liberatory  effect
expected in late Ottoman and Turkish historiography, while providing a reductionist
view of European history and historical analysis tout court. Demographic engineering or
political demography, I suggest, are the offspring of population theories, demographic
concepts  and  methods  elaborated  in  the  thirties  when populations  were  no  longer
regarded as an aggregate of individuals but rather the individual bearers of different
biological values, to be encouraged, discouraged, or prevented through reproduction or
extermination. The de-historicizing effect of demographic engineering is all the more
dangerous in that, by erasing the role of demographic thinking and knowledge in the
problematization of the concept of population, it implies that demographic engineering
is a requirement for having peaceful societies. 
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1. Archivio  Centrale  dello  Stato,  Ministero dell'interno,  Direzione per  la  Demografia  e  Razza
(1938-1944), Parte prima fasc. 12. I. (See Bertaux 2006: 296-297.)
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ABSTRACTS
This  essay  takes  a  critical  stance  on  the  category  of  demographic  engineering.  I  regard
demographic  engineering  as  naturalizing  the  connection  between  population,  territory  and
security eschewing both the modern edge of the concept of population and its power effect. My
argument  is  that  the  connection  between  security  and  population  that  is  underlying
demographic  engineering  is  not  a  ‘natural’  behavior  of  ‘populations’  but  an  artefact  of
demographic  knowledge  that  can  be  traced  back  to  interwar  Europe  when  the  population/
security nexus was reformulated in the light of ‘race suicide,’ ‘depopulation’ and the making of
racial  Jews.  Demographic  engineering is  a  loaded category that  obfuscates  how demographic
knowledge constitutes populations to make them available to political intervention it calls for as
a necessity.
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